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 FOREWORD 
 
 
The present work is the outcome of the activity of the ENIQ Task Group Risk (TGR) on 
Risk-Informed In-service Inspection (RI-ISI).  
 
ENIQ, the European Network for Inspection and Qualification, was set up in 1992 
recognising the importance of the issue of qualification of NDE inspection procedures used in 
in-service inspection programmes for nuclear power plants.  Driven by European Nuclear 
utilities and managed by the European Commission Joint Research Centre (JRC) of Petten, 
the Netherlands. ENIQ was intended to be a network in which the available resources and 
expertise could be managed at European level.  It was also recognised that harmonisation in 
the field of codes and standards for inspection qualification would represent important 
advantages for all parties involved, with the ultimate goal of increasing the safety of 
European nuclear power plants.  
 
The work of ENIQ generated an important milestone with the publication in 1995 of the first 
issue of the European methodology for qualification of non-destructive tests [1].  A second 
issue was then published in 1997 [2]. 
 
ENIQ also recognised the importance of tackling the issue of setting inspection priorities on 
the basis of risk, at a European level.  Traditionally, stringent regulations and codes specify 
the locations, frequency and methods of inspection, based primarily on the type and safety 
class of the component.  However, it has been recognised that much resource has often 
been spent inspecting sites of negligible risk for plant safety.  On the other hand, practical 
experience and the use of probabilistic safety assessments have demonstrated that higher 
risk-importance failures can occur at locations not covered by the traditional inspection 
programme.  As the costs of qualifying and performing such effective inspections are very 
high, the effort should be targeted at the most risk-significant locations. 
 
For this reason, ENIQ set up a sub-group (called Task Group 4, or TG4) in order to help 
homogenise the different activities on risk-informed in-service inspection for nuclear reactor 
safety by promoting and rationalising a common position in the EU.  
 
In 1999, the ENIQ TG4 produced a discussion document [3], which represented a first 
attempt at defining a European framework on RI-ISI.  Such document then stimulated a 
discussion that has resulted in the publication of this work.  
 
At the end of 2001, ENIQ members emphasised the need to strengthen the risk-related 
activities and to promote the full integration of RI-ISI into ENIQ.  In connection with the 
reorganisation of ENIQ’s working groups, TG4 became TGR.  At the inaugural meeting of 
TGR, it was decided that the task group should aim at establishing a common European 
framework on RI-ISI. 
 
The activities of TGR have been complementary to the Task Force of RI-ISI set up by the 
Nuclear Regulators’ Working Group (NRWG).  The NRWG has recently published a 
document summarising the common views of the European Regulators on RI-ISI [4]. 
 
This document is intended to provide guidelines to utilities both for developing their RI-ISI 
approaches and for using or adapting already established approaches to the European 
environment taking into account utility-specific characteristics and national regulatory 
requirements. 
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 1  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
In-service inspection (ISI) is an essential element of the defence in depth concept.  ISI 
consists of non-destructive examination as well as pressure and leakage testing.  ISI helps to 
confirm that basic nuclear safety functions are preserved and that the probability of 
radioactive materials breaching containment is reduced. 
 
Defence in depth is defined by two principles: accident prevention and accident mitigation.  
This high level definition of defence in depth has been traditionally broken down further into 
five levels, the first two being [5]: 
 
1) Prevention of abnormal operation and failures. 
 
2) Control of abnormal operation and detection of failures. 
 
ISI plays an important role in the above-mentioned two levels of defence in depth.  It 
contributes to the prevention of failures by monitoring plant status.  Furthermore, it 
contributes to the control of abnormal operation by detecting degradation in mitigating 
systems. 
 
Risk-informed in-service inspection (RI-ISI) reflects recent developments in Probabilistic 
Safety Assessment (PSA) technology, the understanding of degradation mechanisms (e.g. 
structural reliability modelling, root cause evaluations) and the experience gained from nearly 
10,000 reactor years operating experience of NPPs. 
 
RI-ISI aims at rational plant safety management by taking into account the results of 
plant-specific risk analyses.  The fundamental idea is to identify high-risk locations where the 
inspection efforts should be concentrated.  The objective is to provide an ongoing 
improvement in the overall plant safety, measured by risk, together with reduced doses for 
the inspection teams. 
 
The development of a RI-ISI programme requires expertise from a number of different 
disciplines including inspection, maintenance, design, materials, chemistry, stress analysis, 
systems, PSA, operations and safety.  It also requires a long-term co-ordinated management 
commitment through inspection qualification, inspection result analysis and final feedback to 
the risk analysis, in order to maintain a living ISI programme.  Before embarking on a 
risk-informed programme it is essential, therefore, to obtain the backing and commitment of 
the utility and plant management.  
 
This document is structured as follows.  The scope is laid down in section 2.  In section 3, the 
most relevant definitions that apply herein are given.  The principal elements of RI-ISI are 
described in section 4.  In particular, the RI-ISI scope is discussed in sub-section 4.3.  
Qualitative, quantitative and semi-quantitative methods for RI-ISI are examined in 
sub-section 4.4.  Sub-section 4.7 deals with the assessment of probability of failure.  The 
issues concerning consequence of failure assessment are examined in sub-section 4.8.  Risk 
characterisation and ranking are discussed in sub-section 4.9.  The definition of the ISI 
programme is considered in sub-section 4.10.  In section 5 organization and responsibilities 
in RI-ISI applications are discussed.  In particular, a management structure is suggested.  
Finally, section 6 deals with issues related to the documentation and archiving of the results 
produced in a RI-ISI application. 
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 2 SCOPE 
 
 
The scope of this document is limited to setting out the principles that a body carrying out 
RI-ISI should follow.  The decision on whether a risk-informed approach should or should not 
be applied to devising an inspection strategy is a matter for agreement between the parties 
involved. 
 
This document is intended to provide guidelines about the definition of an in-service 
inspection programme aimed at providing defence in depth as described in the introduction. 
 
This document has been developed specifically for RI-ISI planning in the nuclear industry, 
but the general principles can be adapted to other industrial fields as well.  Although the main 
application area is envisaged to be piping systems, RI-ISI of, for example, the reactor 
pressure vessel (RPV) and internals is not excluded.  However, in the case of the reactor 
pressure vessel and internals, the use of PSA in consequence analysis is somewhat different 
from the applications related to other passive components and piping systems. 
 
This document identifies the key principles that any RI-ISI approach needs to meet.  This is 
regardless of the level of quantification in the assessment of failure probabilities and 
consequences.  However, purely qualitative methods that do not use the PSA in order to 
define the consequences, or any form of structural assessment to determine the probability 
of failure, are not considered in this document.  
 
The link between inspection qualification that complies with the European Qualification 
Methodology [2] and a RI-ISI programme, is identified as an essential step in ensuring the 
reliability of ISI. 
 
This document is intended to be flexible so that different countries can use it to develop 
RI-ISI programmes which are consistent throughout Europe but which also meet their 
different national legal, regulatory and technical requirements. 
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 3 DEFINITIONS  
 
 
Most of the definitions that apply to this document are given in Appendix 1, whereas 
Appendix 2 lists the abbreviations used throughout.   
 
The following concepts are critical within this document and are therefore discussed here in 
more detail. 
 
 
3.1 Failure 
 
Failure of a structural component is an event involving leakage, rupture or a condition that 
would disable its ability to perform its intended safety function.  For piping, failure usually 
involves a leak or a rupture, resulting in a reduction or loss of the pressure-retaining 
capability of the element in question.  The expected plant response depends on the severity 
of the failure, which is generally related to the leak size.  Hence the consequences of the 
piping failure may vary significantly with leak size and it is often necessary to define and 
analyse different degrees of failure states of a single structural element.  
 
 
3.2 Probability of failure (POF) 
 
In Probability Safety Analysis (PSA), the probability of occurrence of failure events is defined 
either in terms of failure frequencies or failure probabilities per demand.  The failure 
frequency is based on the assumption of a constant failure rate.  However, when dealing with 
passive components subject to a time dependent degradation mechanism, the probability of 
failure is not constant with time.  For situations where the probability of failure is low 
throughout the life of the plant this time dependency is probably of little significance and can 
be ignored.  However, if the degradation mechanism is of an aggressive nature, it may not be 
suitable to spread the probability of failure over some given mission period into a constant 
failure frequency.  Such situations require special attention and need to be treated separately 
from any mainstream RI-ISI programme.  In this document the term ‘probability of failure’ is 
used as an abridged version of the full wording ‘probability of failure over a given time into 
the future’.  Probability of failure is also used to refer to a probability of failure on demand in 
the case of components in a stand-by system actuated only on demand. 
 
 
3.3 Consequence of failure (COF) 
 
The precise definition of the consequence is a matter of negotiation between the utility and 
the regulator.  Whatever consequence is chosen, it must be measured as an outcome that is 
conditional on the probability of failure as defined earlier.  This document is premised on the 
assumption that Conditional Core Damage Probability (CCDP) or Conditional Core Damage 
Frequency (CCDF) (depending on the impact of the failure on the plant), as defined by a 
Level-1 PSA, constitutes the minimum requirement for consequence evaluation. 
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 3.4 Risk 
 
The risk is defined herein in the engineering sense as the product of the consequences of a 
failure and the probability of that failure occurring, as follows: 
 
 Risk = {Probability of Failure} ⋅ {Consequence of that Failure} 
 
As probability is dimensionless, it follows that the metric of risk is the same as the metric of 
consequence of failure. 
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 4 PRINCIPLES OF RISK-INFORMED IN-SERVICE INSPECTION 
 
 
Risk-informed ISI aims at a rational plant safety management strategy by taking into account 
the results of plant-specific risk analyses.  
 
The fundamental principles of any risk-informed inspection programme are: 
 
1) The ability to define the consequence, probability and risk associated with 
structural failures so that the ISI programme can focus on an integrated defence 
in depth strategy. 
 
2) The identification of an inspection programme that will decrease the risk from 
selected sites as far as it is practical and with due consideration of the costs and 
accumulated radiation dose to plant workers. 
 
The advantage of such an approach is the optimisation of the inspection efforts.  The term 
‘optimise’ in this context is seen as a process that maintains defence in depth, whilst: 
 
a) improving or at least maintaining the overall plant safety. 
b) minimising the dose to personnel involved in the inspection activities. 
c) providing improved plant reliability. 
 
 
4.1 The process of risk-informed inspection planning  
 
The following are the key elements constituting the process of risk-informed inspection 
planning: 
1) Assurance of the long-term commitment of senior management to the 
risk-informed methodology. 
2) Formation of the RI-ISI assessment team (sub-section 4.2). 
3) Definition of the scope of the equipment/structures to be considered in the 
application (sub-section 4.3). 
4) Collection and analysis of the information required to carry out the risk 
assessment (sub-section 4.5). 
5) Definition of the level of the evaluation (sub-section 4.6). 
6) Assessment of the probability of failure for all the components included in the 
scope of the application (sub-section 4.7). 
7) Assessment of the consequences of failure for all the components included in the 
scope of the application (sub-section 4.8). 
8) Ranking of the risks associated with all the components (sub-section 4.9). 
9) Performing sensitivity studies to determine the impact of changes in key 
assumptions or data (sub-section 4.9.2). 
10) Choice of the components to be inspected according to chosen criteria 
(sub-section 4.10). 
11) Assessment of the implication on inspection qualification (sub-section 4.10.4). 
12) Feed back of the obtained information (after completing the inspection) 
(sub-section 4.11). 
 
Each element is further discussed in the following sub-sections. 
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4.2 Formation of the RI-ISI assessment team 
 
The formation of an appropriate workforce structure is an essential factor in devising and 
implementing a RI-ISI programme.  
 
Such a workforce will need to contain or have access to a large array of different disciplines 
including inspection, maintenance, design, materials, chemistry, stress analysis, systems, 
PSA, operations and safety. 
 
An example of a possible RI-ISI management structure, together with the roles, 
responsibilities and interfaces of the different parties involved, is described in section 5. 
 
 
4.3 RI-ISI scope 
 
The first practical step in developing a RI-ISI programme is to define the scope.  The scope 
definition should clearly define the boundary of the programme, e.g. which systems and 
which structural elements (circumferential welds, longitudinal welds, socket welds, 
attachments, lugs, etc.) are to be included in the programme. 
 
The scope of a RI-ISI programme can be either a full scope programme or, when an 
alternative programme is already in place, a partial scope programme.  The scope should be 
clearly defined and documented. 
 
A full scope programme can be defined as including all passive components and structures, 
including: 
 
1) Those relied upon to perform a nuclear safety function during all design-basis plant 
conditions. 
 
2) Those whose failure could compromise the function of safety-related structures, 
systems, or components or could cause a reactor trip or actuation of a safety-related 
system. 
 
A partial scope programme is restricted to any subset of the systems or functions defining 
the full scope.  The partial scope application can be justified, for instance, if an alternative 
(such as deterministic) programme is in place for the other passive components or piping not 
addressed by the RI-ISI programme.  
 
A full scope RI-ISI programme is recommended because it treats all systems in a consistent 
and objective manner and a greater portion of the plant risk from pressure boundary failures 
is addressed.  Nonetheless, it is recognised that in the application of RI-ISI, a partial scope 
programme could be justified.  
 
A RI-ISI methodology should allow flexibility in determining the scope of application.  
Therefore, conducting the application on a large scale (e.g. a whole plant application), a 
system specific application (e.g. a single system) or a class of components (e.g. the reactor 
coolant pressure boundary) should still produce consistent and reliable results.  
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 4.4 Qualitative, quantitative and semi-quantitative methods for 
RI-ISI 
 
In principle, three different approaches to the use of risk concepts in developing ISI 
programmes can be envisioned: the purely quantitative, the semi-quantitative and the purely 
qualitative approach.  These are defined in Appendix 1 under “Approaches to RI-ISI”. 
 
In the nuclear industry the risks are assessed by means of PSA, which is an advanced 
quantitative approach (versus the more qualitative risk assessments used in other hazardous 
industries).  The use of PSA is the foundation of risk-informed approaches in the nuclear 
industry, and thus a purely qualitative approach to RI-ISI that does not make use of PSA 
insights would be difficult to justify.  Therefore, whilst it is recognised that useful risk insights 
can also be gained with qualitative assessments, this document does not cover the 
application of a purely qualitative approach to RI-ISI. 
 
Ideally, a purely quantitative approach should be chosen whenever feasible, as only in this 
framework is it possible to quantify the risk change achieved when implementing the RI-ISI 
programme. However, it is recognised that the current state of knowledge and understanding 
of some of the degradation mechanisms and the availability of the required plant data can be 
insufficient to accurately quantify the probability of failure (see sub-section 4.7).  Likewise, it 
is recognised that many current PSA analyses may not be detailed enough for the level 
required in an ISI application, and thus the consequence analysis must be complemented by 
some degree of qualitative assessment (see sub-section 4.8). 
 
Thus, the most feasible approach to the development of any RI-ISI programme today would 
be the semi-quantitative one, based on a plant-specific PSA and with due cognisance of the 
current mechanistic understanding of any degradation mechanisms. 
 
 
4.5 Information collection and analysis for a RI-ISI assessment 
 
The process of risk-informed inspection planning brings together a large amount of 
information from many different sources, which needs to be collected and analysed.  This 
information can be classified in the following five categories: 
 
1) Equipment data. 
2) Historical plant operating data. 
3) General nuclear industry information. 
4) Safety Analysis Report and technical specifications. 
5) PSA data. 
 
The information required will depend on the approach adopted, but may include: 
 
Equipment data 
 
a) Design and manufacturing records. 
b) As built information. 
c) Design basis conditions. 
d) Deterministic design stress and fatigue analysis. 
e) Defined boundaries of plant items to be considered for inspection planning. 
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 Historical plant data 
 
a) Operational transient and condition monitoring data. 
b) Plant failures and service experience data. 
c) Pre-service and in-service inspection records. 
d) Environmental conditions including temperatures, water chemistry and flow rates. 
e) In-service degradation assessments (fatigue, SCC, erosion-corrosion, external 
effects). 
 
General nuclear industry information 
 
a) National and international databases. 
b) National and international publications. 
 
Safety analysis report and technical specifications 
 
a) Test procedures and frequencies. 
b) Emergency operating procedures. 
c) System failure procedures. 
 
PSA data 
 
a) Failure frequencies. 
b) Failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA). 
c) Frequencies of initiating events (internal and external). 
d) Data on human reliability and common cause failures (CCF). 
e) System design. 
f) Success criteria. 
 
The availability and accessibility of this information will vary depending on the particular 
circumstances. 
 
Data collection is an essential part of the RI-ISI process, as it constitutes the basis for the 
whole analysis and decision process.  Due care and diligence should therefore be practised 
during this phase.  Data collection is likely to be a resource-demanding phase in the RI-ISI 
process but the data gathered should be of considerable value for many safety or reliability 
related activities, for example, periodic safety review.  The RI-ISI team should therefore 
ensure that this data is also made available for other management planning activities. 
 
 
4.6 Level of evaluation 
 
The risk assessment in a RI-ISI programme can be carried out either at the element level 
(e.g. each weld and discontinuity) or for groups of contiguous elements where all relevant 
conditions are the same. 
The advantage of evaluation at element level is that the output will be unique for every 
element and there will be a clear distinction between elements.  However, to reach this 
distinction between the elements, a rather large amount of detailed input data is needed 
which might be prohibitive from a cost point of view. 
The main advantage of grouping elements with the same conditions (a process termed 
segmentation) is that it is less time consuming.  The initial segmentation is normally based 
on the postulated direct consequences of a failure, but it is important that indirect 
consequences are also considered.  Piping segments are normally defined at major 
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 components such as pumps, heat exchangers, check-valves, remote controlled valves or at 
pipe size changes.  The possibility for operator action to mitigate the consequence can also 
be a reason for a segment boundary. 
 
 
4.7 Probability of failure assessment 
 
The first step in the assessment of the probability of failure of a structural element or 
segment is the identification of the potential degradation mechanisms.  This requires the 
qualitative evaluation of a range of influential parameters, such as, design and fabrication 
information, loadings, environmental conditions, and inspection results.  This analysis should 
be supported with a review of operating experience from the plant, its sister units and similar 
plants as well as insights from world-wide generic data.  Such an analysis phase is very 
important in order to correctly classify or quantify the failure potential. 
 
Ideally, the probability of failure of components or sites that are potentially in need of 
inspection should be calculated in a quantitative way, implying the use of structural reliability 
models (SRMs).  However, two important facts are recognised concerning the use of SRMs.  
Firstly, such models do not exist for all the potential degradation mechanisms that currently 
affect nuclear power plants.  Secondly, for degradation mechanisms that do have a viable 
SRM, there is only a limited acceptance that these estimates can be seen as representing 
some form of true or absolute value.  This implies that the evaluation of the probability of 
failure for all potential ISI sites will necessarily yield a mixture of quantitative and qualitative 
assessments.  Quantitative values, where they exist, may serve to quantify relative 
differences in the probability of failure from one site to another.  
 
It is thus envisaged that the most likely way failure probabilities can be presently estimated 
for RI-ISI applications, is on the basis of a combination of quantitative and qualitative 
assessments.  Such an approach is referred to as a ‘semi-quantitative’ analysis.  This form of 
analysis would use all the potential knowledge available to derive an auditable ranking of the 
probability of failure.  
 
A semi-quantitative analysis of the probability of failure can be obtained by:  
 
1) Use of structural reliability models, where they exist, to provide a good estimate 
of the relative differences in the failure probabilities (see sub-section 4.7.1). 
2) Statistical estimates based on both plant-specific and global databases in order 
to provide anchoring points for both the SRM analysis and the expert judgments 
(see sub-section 4.7.2). 
3) Use of formal expert judgements using a combination of deterministic structural 
models and design insight (see sub-section 4.7.3).  
 
It should be recognised that there is not a single, optimal method for assigning probability of 
failure.  As such, each above mentioned approaches, or combination of them, needs to 
address the issues identified herein. 
 
The issue of leak detection arguments within the RI-ISI framework is discussed in 
sub-section 4.9.4.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
   15
 4.7.1 Structural reliability models 
 
Whilst it is recognised that there are several degradation mechanisms not covered with the 
available analytical tools, structural reliability models (SRM) are essential tools in the 
evaluation of probabilities of failure for components of nuclear power plants. 
 
It is essential to verify and validate any SRMs used in the evaluation of probabilities of 
failure.  To this end, a number of steps can be defined [6]: 
 
1) The basic programming should be shown to have suitable quality assurance 
documentation. 
2) The scope, the analytical assumptions and the limitations of the modelling 
capability should be well defined. 
3) The analytical assumptions should be well grounded and based on theory that is 
accepted as representative of the situations considered by the given SRM.  
4) The model should be capable of reproducing the data on which its analytical 
assumptions are based.  Examples should be provided that can demonstrate its 
general agreement with the available experimental data. 
5) Attempts should be made to show how the model compares with the world or 
field data, accepting the inherent limitation of this data.  
6) The model should be benchmarked against other SRM models within the same 
field or scope and any differences should be adequately explained. 
 
Further key elements within a SRM are recognised to be: 
 
a) The choice of statistical distributions.  The reasons behind a specific choice of 
distribution should be made clear and, if possible, a mechanistic understanding of 
the choice should be made.  If the choice is made based on a best-fit evaluation 
of the data, then a comparison with other distributions should be made.  In many 
cases, especially when very small failure probabilities are evaluated, the tails of 
the distributions become important.  
 
b) Sensitivity analyses should always be performed to assess the influence of 
different parameters and choice of statistical distributions. Note that it is 
recommended to use best estimate values of each set of input data, based on the 
best available knowledge at the given time.  If in-built pessimistic design data is 
used, conservative estimates of the risk will be obtained, which may distort the 
relative risk ranking, especially when different types of components and failure 
modes are compared. 
 
An advantage of many SRMs is the possibility to quantify the influence of inspections both in 
terms of inspection capability and frequency.  This is a key factor in RI-ISI since it is 
desirable to select the most appropriate inspection capability for every risk site.   
 
Further discussion on requirements and recommendations that should be set for SRM and 
associated software for RI-ISI applications are found in the reports produced within the 
NURBIM project [6]. 
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 4.7.2 Estimation from operating experience data 
 
Operating experience data provides useful qualitative and quantitative information on the 
degradation of structural components.  For example, Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC) was 
discovered from field failures.  Operating experience data covers not only leak and rupture 
data, but also other information on the presence of non-critical levels of degradation, such as 
small defects and wall thinning.  The degradation information can be of considerable value in 
the development of SRMs and more generally in the assessment of structural failure 
probabilities.  
 
In principle, operating experience data can, and indeed should be, considered in the 
evaluation of failure potential.  The data should be broken down according to, for example, 
specific degradation mechanisms, pipe size classes, and major material and environmental 
characteristics.  The data should be broken down as finely as possible without becoming too 
sparse.  However, when parameters are estimated from structural component failure or 
degradation databases, the following shortcomings have to be taken into consideration: 
 
1) Passive components usually have an increasing failure rate (ageing), and thus 
the exponential distribution does not correctly model the failure occurrence. 
2) The data quality may be insufficient for obtaining reliable estimates due to: 
a. missing information related to the component population.  
b. uncertainties related to failure mechanisms and root causes. 
3) Data is often very scarce. 
 
Due to the shortcomings related to the quality and quantity of data, the estimates of passive 
component failure probabilities are subject to large uncertainties.  For RI-ISI applications, 
probability of failure estimates obtainable from world-wide or generic data may not be 
sufficient.  However, the data is extremely valuable in establishing prior probabilities.  These 
values can then act as an anchor for either the SRM estimates or expert judgement, using 
plant-specific information, to identify the distribution of the probability of failure throughout the 
plant-specific sites. 
 
 
4.7.3 Use of expert judgement through expert elicitation  
 
The shortcomings in both SRM and operating experience data will sometimes limit a 
quantitative assessment of some of the active degradation mechanisms of interest.  A 
possible alternative is to use expert judgement, preferably through the use of formal expert 
elicitation, to derive failure probabilities. 
 
Well-structured expert elicitations can be a powerful tool for expanding the range of 
application of a RI-ISI.  Such elicitations support and integrate individual expert judgements 
to provide an auditable set of probability of failure estimates.  However, it is important to 
ensure that the use of this expert judgement is conducted within a structured expert 
elicitation process.  The principal phases of a structured expert elicitation are: 
 
1) Selection and training of experts. 
2) Elicitation of judgements. 
3) Modelling and combination of judgements. 
4) Sensitivity analyses. 
5) Discussion and feedback from experts. 
6) Documentation. 
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 It is recognised that experts are often not very familiar with probabilities, especially with 
subjective probability statements, and thus the training phase to give probabilistic estimates 
is important.  The person leading the structured expert elicitation process should have proper 
knowledge in decision analysis, probabilities and statistics.  This person is called the 
normative expert.  His, or her, responsibility is to facilitate the process by giving training, 
conducting the elicitation and aggregating the expert opinions.  A detailed discussion on the 
expert assessment approach within the nuclear industry can be found, for example in [7]. 
 
Using an expert judgement for all sites, including those for which an SRM and/or possible 
statistical data exists, can combine qualitative and quantitative probability of failure 
estimates.  The SRM and/or statistical data then act as both an anchor for the rankings and 
as a form of cross correlation with the expert ranking.  An example of such approach is 
described in [6]. 
 
 
4.8 Consequence of failure 
 
The failure of a passive component in a nuclear power plant (NPP) can basically lead to one 
of the following classes of events of interest: 
 
1) Initiating event: A pressure boundary failure occurs in an operating system resulting 
in an initiating event. 
2) Loss of mitigating ability (stand-by): A pressure boundary failure occurs in a standby 
system and does not result in an initiating event, but degrades the mitigating 
capabilities of a system or train.  After the failure is discovered (if discovered), the 
plant enters the Allowed Outage Time defined in the Technical Specification. 
3) Loss of mitigating ability (demand): A pressure boundary failure occurs in a standby 
system when the system/train operation is required by an independent demand. 
4) Combination: A pressure boundary failure causes an initiating event with an 
additional loss of mitigating ability (in addition to the expected mitigating degradation 
due to the initiator). 
 
Furthermore, a pressure boundary failure that also affects the containment performance can 
be identified as a separate class. 
 
The consequence analysis part of the RI-ISI process aims at evaluating the impacts of any of 
the above-mentioned events on plant risk.  The consequence evaluation consists of the 
following primary steps: 
 
a) A qualitative failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) that determines the plant 
impacts of postulated failures of postulated sizes (e.g. small, medium, complete 
rupture).  This step can consume the largest share of resources. 
 
b) Qualification of the PSA for RI-ISI application. 
 
c) Quantitative analysis with PSA. 
 
PSA techniques have been developed since the 1970s [8] and PSA studies exist today for 
most types of nuclear power plants and individual power stations.  Although the level of 
details and quality of these studies vary, the PSA methodology has become a well-known 
and frequently used tool in the analysis of nuclear safety. 
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 The following items are considered critical if a robust interface between PSA and RI-ISI is to 
be developed: 
 
• The levels and scope of PSA to be used in RI-ISI (sub-section 4.8.1). 
• PSA quality, limitations and uncertainties (sub-section 4.8.2). 
• Passive component failure treatment (sub-section 4.8.3). 
 
 
4.8.1 Levels and scope of PSA to be used in RI-ISI 
 
PSAs are performed at different levels, dealing with different types of consequences: 
 
Level 1:  Assessment of plant failures leading to core damage (CD) and the estimation 
of core damage frequency (CDF). 
Level 2:  Estimation of off-site fission product release.  Consequences are usually 
expressed in terms of large early release frequency (LERF). 
Level 3:  Assessment of off-site consequences leading to estimates of the effects of 
fission product release on human health.  Consequences are usually 
expressed in terms of human fatalities, public radiation doses and 
environmental pollution. 
 
All modern NPPs have plant-specific PSA studies, usually at Levels 1 and 2.  For this 
reason, it appears logical that they should form the basis for the consequence evaluation.  
Recent RI-ISI applications have mainly relied on the Level 1 consequence analysis.  It is 
recognised that the use of Level 2 consequence (e.g. large early release) could be important 
for RI-ISI application, especially for reactors whose complete primary pressure boundary is 
not fully covered by the containment structure (for instance, RBMK and BWR reactors).  In 
this case it should be borne in mind that Level 2 studies are based on assumptions and 
hypotheses that can be very difficult to verify in practice and thus are in general subject to 
higher uncertainties than estimates of core damage. 
 
In view of the above, it is concluded that the Level 1 PSA forms the recommended (as well 
as the minimum) basis for analyses, but insights from Level 2 can be considered in handling 
priorities for elements with lower probability of failure but higher consequences. 
 
The scope of a comprehensive PSA Level 1 study includes evaluation of the risk at power 
operation, start-up, shut down and cold shutdown.  Among the initiating events that are 
usually considered are typical transients, loss-of-coolant accidents (LOCAs), fire, flooding, 
seismic and other external events. 
 
The basic demand on the scope of the PSA is that all operating plant modes and initiating 
events must be addressed in the evaluation.  It is however, not necessary that all modes and 
events are included in the calculations.  A qualitative treatment of missing modes and events 
is sufficient when they have little influence on the result.  This will differ from plant to plant. 
 
 
4.8.2 PSA quality and limitations 
 
It is important to develop results in the RI-ISI programme that are robust.  Therefore the PSA 
study should be qualified for this purpose.  
 
An overriding requirement is that the PSA should realistically reflect the actual design, 
construction, operational practices and operational experiences of the plant.  The PSA 
should reflect the plant’s different functions with the same accuracy and level of detail.  The 
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 evaluation of system demands should be done with the same level of realism and 
conservatism for all functions, and the input data used for PSA analyses should be verified to 
ensure that it reflects the state of the art. 
 
It is recommended that the PSA study be qualified/certified for use in RI-ISI application by 
fulfilling demands specified by ASME standard or IAEA standards/requirements (to be 
published).  The qualification/certification could also be performed by peer review of the PSA 
for RI-ISI application.  The qualification of the PSA should be documented [9-14]. 
 
Due to the small probabilities of failure of passive components in comparison with active 
components, the former usually only contribute to a small proportion of the total plant risk 
evaluated in the PSA study.  Moreover, because of low probabilities of failure, the data 
available regarding passive failures is usually limited.  This has naturally led to very limited 
treatment of such failures within PSA studies.  Due consideration must be given to this fact 
and how the passive components should be treated in the consequence analysis.  The next 
sub-section (4.8.3) discusses this issue in more detail. 
 
If it is considered that the PSA does not fully meet the quality requirements for RI-ISI 
application, specific attention should be paid to its use in the consequence evaluation.  The 
PSA may still provide useful information for the analysis, but in this situation it should be 
supported by complementary analyses that may be of qualitative nature. 
 
Each PSA study is also subject to unavoidable uncertainties, such as parameter 
uncertainties, model uncertainties and completeness uncertainties.  Parameter uncertainties 
related to statistical data are usually quantified and a PSA study provides uncertainty 
boundaries as a part of its output.  Model and completeness uncertainties are normally not 
included in the PSA study, but they have to be evaluated in the process of PSA qualification. 
 
Quantified PSA uncertainties, such as parameter uncertainties, could be transferred to the 
RI-ISI procedure to increase its robustness significantly, but it is recognised that there are no 
straightforward algorithms to do so.  The RI-ISI evaluation should specify the effects of the 
parameter uncertainties in connection to sensitivity analyses (sub-section 4.9.2). 
 
 
4.8.3 Passive component failure treatment 
 
Pipe breaks are modelled directly as initiating events such as Loss of Coolant Accidents 
(LOCAs), main steam or feed-water line breaks or flooding.  PSA studies may spatially 
subdivide the pipework into zones and then consider various types of LOCAs occurring 
within the zone as initiating events but the studies do not normally model initiating events at 
segment or element level.  Furthermore, the components are normally modelled in the PSA 
with two states: full function or total failure.  In the case of piping, these states are ‘no 
leakage’ and ‘complete pipe break’.  Thus, a ‘partly failed’ component (such as a crack or a 
small leak) that is handled by a manual action is not modelled in the basic PSA.  All events 
leading to an automatic initiation of safety systems are included in the PSA. 
 
As the modelling of structural components in the base PSA may be coarse and deficient for 
many systems, additional analysis is required to determine the consequences at the degree 
of detail needed in RI-ISI.  A complementary FMEA should be conducted in order to define 
both the direct and indirect impact of failure on plant operation.  Indirect effects include failure 
consequences affecting other systems, components or piping segments, such as:  
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 1) Pipe whip.  
2) Jet impingement.  
3) Decompression waves.  
4) Flooding.  
5) High environmental temperatures, etc. 
 
It is recognised that indirect effects of passive component boundary failures may have a 
significant influence on the evaluation of core damage frequency and it is therefore 
recommended that such effects be explicitly taken into account.  Spatial consequences are 
determined based on the location of the failure and relative position of important equipment, 
and it is recommended that the analyses be confirmed by a walk-down. 
 
The FMEA should include the evaluation of consequences of a spectrum of leak sizes with 
considerations of leak detection (see sub-section 4.9.4.1), and the analysis of the possibility 
to isolate the leak or break.  Both automatic and manual isolation should be considered. 
 
The extent to which the findings of the FMEA can be incorporated in the PSA model for the 
quantitative consequence evaluation depends on the PSA and plant-specific issues.  Issues 
not explicitly included in the PSA model should be judged qualitatively and be taken into 
account in the final review and adjustment of the consequence ranking. 
 
The base PSA does not usually include models of passive component failures that could 
result in the loss of mitigating ability (e.g. safety system pipe break).  A way to address such 
situations is to identify basic events or groups of events already modelled in the PSA, whose 
failure captures the effects of a piping segment failure.  This method is sometimes called the 
‘surrogate component approach’. 
 
The uses of the plant-specific PSA in the RI-ISI analysis can be summarised as follows: 
 
a) The PSA model and success criteria are used to define safety functions and 
backup trains. 
b) PSA results for all initiators are applied directly for relevant consequence impacts. 
c) PSA system and/or train unavailability are used to determine the reliability of 
mitigative equipment given a pressure boundary failure. 
d) Internal flood results are used in the analysis of spatial effects. 
e) External events studies (e.g. fire analysis) results are used in the evaluation of 
external events. 
f) Shutdown PSA, if available, is used in the evaluation of other modes of operation. 
g) Level 2 PSA results are used to identify event sequences that provide the dominant 
contribution to LERF with respect to pipework failures. 
 
 
4.9 Risk characterisation and ranking 
 
This sub-section provides guidance on how the risk characterisation and ranking may be 
developed to support establishing the ISI programme.  As already stated, risk is defined in 
engineering terms as the product of the measure of the consequence resulting from a failure 
and the probability of that failure occurring within a given period of time.  Combining the 
information from the probability of failure assessments and the consequence analyses forms 
the risk ranking.  The risk ranking can be carried out at either element level or segment level.  
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 4.9.1 Graphical representation of risk 
 
Each segment or element can be ranked from highest to lowest according to its risk.  A 
useful way to evaluate the risk of failure and clearly represent it in a graphical way is to 
develop risk plots, risk matrices or Pareto risk diagrams.  
 
In risk plots, each component is represented as a point on a log-log plot.  The consequence 
of failure is represented on the x-axis (the abscissa of the point).  The probability of failure is 
represented on the y-axis (the ordinate of the point).  Refer to Figure 1 for an example of a 
risk plot. 
 
A risk plot provides a clear picture of how the risk is distributed over the range of 
consequences.  Given the nature of the risk plot, log-log axes, sites of constant risk are 
identified by straight lines.  This fact greatly aids risk visualisation and ranking for the given 
parameters and assumptions.  Parallel lines of constant risk can be drawn at fixed distances 
apart, identifying risk bands (for example, decades). 
 
In a semi-quantitative approach to risk, probability of failure and consequence of failure are 
not numerically evaluated in absolute terms, but are ranked using either a qualitative scale 
such as high, medium, low, or broad categories such as 10-3 to 10-4 etc.  In this case, a risk 
matrix can be used to represent the rankings in the form of subsets as shown in Figure 2. 
 
Another way to graphically represent the risk is by means of the Pareto risk diagram.  A 
Pareto risk diagram shows the risk from individual components ranked in a descending order 
in the form of histograms.  See examples of Pareto diagrams (linear and logarithmic) in 
Figure 3.  The Pareto plot is closely related to the Risk Reduction Worth (RRW), commonly 
used in PSA technology.  This relationship between the Pareto diagram and the RRW is 
discussed in Reference [6] 
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Figure 1 Risk plot (the plot is purely illustrative) 
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 Whilst the Pareto plot gives a ready impression of the risk distribution and the amount of risk 
being addressed by a given inspection, the risk plot and risk matrix are probably better 
graphical representations with regards to inspection planning.  These are more informative 
since they also show if the risk is governed by the probability of failure or by its consequence.  
‘High consequence–low probability’ sites require different considerations than ‘high 
probability–low consequence’ sites even if they have an equal total risk.  This issue is further 
discussed in sub-sections 4.9.4.2 and 4.9.4.3. 
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Figure 2 Risk Matrix (the values used in this table are purely illustrative and should in no 
way be taken as a requirement). 
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Figure 3 Pareto diagram (the diagram is purely illustrative) 
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4.9.2 Sensitivity analysis 
 
Sensitivity studies should be performed to determine if changes in key assumptions or data 
could have any significant impact on the rankings.  These sensitivity studies should address 
the potential changes in component ranking by varying the estimates of pressure boundary 
failures and estimates of the consequence of failure.  Also, crediting the effect of leak 
detection on the results should be investigated.  These results should then be integrated in 
the decision-making process.  
 
The sensitivity studies can identify potential risk outliers by identifying ISI components that 
could dominate risk for various operational modes, PSA assumptions, and data and model 
uncertainties.  
 
 
4.9.3 Safety-significant sites 
 
The development of a risk plot or ranking does not in itself identify sites that could be said to 
be safety-significant.  Such a choice is subjective.  What follows is only advisory but provides 
a possible structure for discussion between the utility and the regulator. 
 
In addressing this question it must be borne in mind that in-service inspection leads to 
radiation exposure to the inspection personnel.  Each combination of ISI programme is 
associated with a certain radiation exposure.  In principle, it is possible to develop ISI 
programmes with the same risk reduction but with different total radiation exposure.  When 
faced with such choice, the RI-ISI programme that give as little radiation exposure as 
possible should be chosen, according to the As Low As Reasonably Practical (ALARP) 
principle. 
 
The first step in the process of determining risk-significant sites is the identification of risk 
outliers.  Risk outliers are sites that have a much higher risk than the overall mean risk level 
for all sites.  Outliers should be treated as recommended in sub-section 4.9.3.1. 
 
The second step consists of defining a risk value, relative to the highest risk (excluding any 
outliers) that can be considered as the level separating potentially safety-significant sites 
from those that can be considered as non safety-significant.  Sites falling above this level are 
considered as potentially safety-significant.  No specific relative risk level is given here since 
different factors may need to be considered for different utilities and different regulatory 
bodies.  Among such factors are for example the risk distribution of the plant, the definition of 
risk outliers, the nature of risk associated with each site, the ambition the utility has with its 
RI-ISI programme and national regulatory requirements. 
 
Having identified the potentially safety-significant sites for a RI-SI programme, it is 
recommended that an expert panel is used to review the proposed sites.  This panel should 
review the information, analysis and insights that have been used to identify the 
safety-significant sites.  It is also important to investigate alternative possibilities for mitigation 
against the risk.  It is, therefore, necessary to look at the nature of the risk associated with 
each site.  It may be possible to identify ways other than inspection to address the risk.  
 
If the RI-ISI analysis is done at segment level, the evaluation of safety significance is also 
done first at segment level.  In this case, the probability of failure and consequence are 
evaluated for a representative element within the segment.  The risk associated with such 
elements also approximates the risk of the other elements within the segment.  Naturally, 
potentially safety-significant sites are identified among the most safety-significant segments. 
The selection of sites should then be reviewed by the expert panel as described above. 
   24
  
4.9.3.1 Risk outliers 
 
A risk outlier is a site with an associated risk much higher than the overall risk level for most 
of the sites.  Risk outliers, the few sites dominating the overall risk, should be treated 
carefully to avoid giving a skewed view of the risk distribution.  
 
The occurrence of risk outliers should be seen as a situation requiring special treatment.  
Inspection alone may not be considered sufficient to address the risk from such sites and 
consideration should be given to other complementary methods such as continuous 
monitoring, improved leak rate detection, load reduction or component replacement. 
 
4.9.3.2 Flat risk distribution 
 
There are situations where the principle of identifying a specific risk band to determine which 
sites are safety-significant is not applicable.  One such situation occurs when the risk 
distribution across the plant is very flat.  In this case the Pareto diagram, see sub-section 
4.9.1, would show the flat distribution across all the proposed inspection sites whilst the risk 
plot would show that a great number of the sites having the highest risk fall in the same 
narrow risk band.  Risk may then no longer be a very meaningful way of differentiating 
between sites for inspection.  One logical option would be to weight the inspection in terms of 
the consequence, with possibly some random inspections. 
 
 
4.9.4 Specific issues 
 
4.9.4.1 Leak detection 
 
For several degradation mechanisms known to act in nuclear power plants, extensive 
experience accumulated over several years of operation has shown that failure does not 
occur catastrophically (double edge guillotine break) but rather in the form of a leak.  This 
implies that any crack that grows to a through-wall configuration is likely to be detected by 
plant monitoring systems before reaching a size that would result in a rupture. 
 
The leak detection functions are part of the defence in depth strategy, level 3 - Control of 
accident within the design basis, as defined in INSAG 10 [5].  Such functions must be 
designed to handle situations when other steps in the defence in depth chain have failed. 
 
Leak detection functions in some plants are part of the reactor protection system as they 
automatically initiate the plant safety function when the leak rate exceeds a specified value.  
Furthermore, the technical specifications and operating procedures give the operators 
guidance on how to act when the leakages increase above certain rates.  
 
In the case of degradation mechanisms with an anticipated leak before break, the probability 
of large leak or rupture is affected by the detection probability of the (small) leak before it 
develops to a larger leak.  Leak detection thus is an issue related both to the probability and 
the consequence of failure. 
 
RI-ISI analyses should, in principle, include the effects of leak-detection both in the case of 
actuation of automatic safety functions and of manual actions.  The reliability of leak 
detection and related actions could be quantified in the consequence evaluation, SRM 
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 models or a combination of both.  The RI-ISI documentation should identify in which part of 
the study these issues are modelled. 
 
Within the RI-ISI framework, some studies [6] have shown that neglecting leak rate detection 
in the assessment of probability of failure may cause an unjustified focus on low-risk 
components for inspection selection.  Since the rupture and large leak probabilities will 
approach the small leak probabilities, it will be more difficult to identify the highest risk 
locations.  On the other hand, experience has shown that crediting leak detection may result 
in RI-ISI programmes with almost no inspection required for piping located inside 
containment.  Whilst this could be perfectly justified from a risk assessment point of view, it is 
envisaged that such result could present a problem of acceptability. 
 
When crediting leak detection, care should be taken to ensure that conservative or 
non-conservative assumptions are not imposed on the analysis.  Leak rate detection should 
only be credited when evaluating the probability of failure if it is commensurate with the leak 
detection capabilities, operating procedures and licensing basis of the plant.  In this context it 
is required that adequate models of crack opening areas, leak flow rates and leak flow rate 
detection are available.  The assumed reliability of leak detection capability, its basis and its 
impact on the results should be documented. 
 
In areas without specific leak detection systems, leaks may be detected (for example) by 
means of other alarms or by walk-around.  To be consistent in the analysis of failure 
probabilities, the probability of leak detection should be estimated also for elements or 
segments at such locations.  It is however recognised that a reliable and consistent 
modelling of leak detection is a difficult task that carries large uncertainties. 
 
When investigating the probability of failure, it is recommended that both the effects of 
crediting and not crediting leak detection be investigated. 
 
4.9.4.2 High consequence – low probability of failure sites 
 
It is recognised that sites characterised by high consequence and low probability of failure 
can be of concern even if the risk at such sites is not high in absolute or relative terms.  Such 
sites would fall in the lower right hand corner of a risk plot (see Figure 4).  Note that these 
sites are not identified directly by the Pareto plot or the RRW measure.  
 
These sites are considered not to be safety-significant due to the very small associated 
probability of failure.  However, it is recognised that a problem of confidence can arise if the 
component’s probability of failure is well below the area for which there is any practical 
experience.  Any inspection in this area is intended to provide additional confidence in the 
assessed probability of failure.  In this way the inspection can be considered to cover an 
unknown or unexpected degradation mechanism that could challenge the integrity of the 
component and thus provides an element of conceptual defence in depth. 
 
Very low probability of failure implies that there is no identifiable damage mechanism, and a 
failure over the lifetime of the component is considered incredible.  The setting of inspection 
qualification goals is therefore not a straightforward matter and it is likely that the approach 
may vary, depending, upon circumstances and regulatory requirements. 
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 4.9.4.3 High probability of failure – low consequence sites 
 
Despite their appreciable probability of failure, components falling in the upper left corner of 
the risk plot in Figure 4 are not risk-significant due to their low impact in terms of nuclear 
safety. 
 
For such items it may be possible that a failure over the lifetime of the plant is reasonably 
foreseeable.  In these cases, inspection could be justified in order to maintain plant 
availability, improve workers’ safety and provide an indication of a good nuclear safety 
culture. 
 
Specification of a defect type and size for ISI is likely to be relatively straightforward as such 
sites have a clearly identifiable damage mechanism.  Since this region of the risk plot is not 
safety-significant the utility could consider carrying out a financial risk assessment to identify 
those risks that would return the greatest financial benefit in terms of improved plant 
availability.  This could then form the basis for a financially optimised inspection programme.  
Furthermore, since this area is not risk-significant, the level and form of any inspection 
qualification should be a matter for the utility to decide.  However, there is no intent here to 
undermine the value of these inspections.  Any failures in nuclear power plant influence the 
safety culture and the perception of risk by the public. 
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Figure 4 Risk plot showing the high probability – low consequence region and the high 
consequence – low probability region (the plot is purely illustrative; the way the 
two regions are represented should in no way be taken as a requirement). 
 
 
4.10 Definition of the ISI programme  
 
The overall principle underlying the definition of the RI-ISI programme, e.g. the identification 
and selection of individual sites for inspection, is that the proposed inspection programme 
should provide defence in depth as discussed in section 1. 
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 It was recognised in sub-section 4.4 that even when a purely quantitative analysis has been 
performed, it is very difficult to demonstrate that the assessed levels of risk are true in 
absolute terms.  It is thus also very difficult to compare the total risk assessed for one plant 
with that calculated for another and therefore this document does not give recommendations 
based on absolute risk levels.  For this reason, the proposed approach is based only on the 
relative risk ranking. 
 
 
4.10.1 Minimum valid RI-ISI programme 
 
In sub-section 4.9.3 it was suggested that the first step to define a valid RI-ISI programme 
consists of identifying the possible existence of risk outliers (and treat this separately).  The 
second step is to define which sites should be identified as potentially safety-significant.  
These should then be seen as the primary candidates for inclusion in a risk-informed 
inspection programme. 
 
After having identified the potentially safety-significant sites, the next step is to select the 
sub-set to be included in the inspection programme.  In selecting these sites, other criteria 
than risk can also be considered.  Such criteria are, for example, the severity of the 
degradation mechanisms, radiation dose, accessibility of the site and the inspection costs. 
 
Sites that have a low probability of failure but high consequence should be considered for 
inclusion, as discussed in sub-section 4.9.4.2.  Also, due consideration should be given to 
the low consequence but high probability of failure sites, as discussed in sub-section 4.9.4.3. 
 
After having established an initial selection of candidate sites based on these criteria, the risk 
associated with such elements should be compared with the risk associated with the sites 
forming the scope of the current (deterministic) ISI programme.  The total risk being 
addressed by the selected sites should address at least as much but preferably more than 
the total risk addressed by the current ISI programme. 
 
When moving to a RI-ISI programme, at least risk neutrality or, better, risk reduction should 
be achieved.  The risk reduction achieved depends not only on the risk addressed, but also 
on the capability and frequency (intervals) of the inspections.  In the following sub-section, 
the issue of risk reduction is discussed in more detail. 
 
The scope of the RI-ISI programme may also need to be completed with sites requiring 
inspection in order to meet other legal requirements, for instance in relation to the safety 
protection of workers. 
 
 
4.10.2 Risk reduction achieved through ISI 
 
An accurate estimate of the risk reduction can be calculated only if a quantitative measure of 
the inspection capability (e.g. a Probability of Detection, or POD curve) is known.  When 
such a measure of the inspection capability is available, a structural reliability model could be 
used to quantify the risk reduction, see sub-section 4.7.1.  However, it is recognised that in 
the majority of cases, this measure is not available and would require a disproportionate use 
of resources to obtain it. 
 
To gain confidence that the proposed new ISI programme is at least as effective as the 
current ISI programme in reducing risk, it is recommended that the two programmes be 
compared simply by using as input the risk estimates of each site, the inspection intervals, 
and a hypothetical probability of detection.  
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 The sensitivity of the results to the assumed inspection capability should be studied by 
varying this parameter.  In this comparison, the time interval considered should correspond 
to the completion of the ISI scope (e.g. 10 years) or may even be the expected remaining 
lifetime of the plant.  These analyses could also be used the other way around to identify the 
level of inspection capability required for achieving a certain risk reduction.   
 
 
4.10.3 Inspection intervals 
 
Currently, most in-service inspection intervals are either set by a code, such as ASME 
section XI [15], by some consensus between the regulator and the utility or by some form of 
deterministic principle, usually based on design considerations and general technical 
experience. 
 
When sites are selected for inspection based on risk, inspection intervals should be reviewed 
considering the information available on the acting degradation mechanisms, the inspection 
capability and the risk importance of each location.  
 
Keeping in mind the fundamental principle of achieving risk neutrality or possibly risk 
reduction, it is beyond the scope of this document to provide more explicit requirements 
regarding inspection intervals. 
 
In principle, optimal inspection intervals could be determined by means of, for example, 
validated SRMs coupled with the knowledge of POD curves. 
 
 
4.10.4 Inspection qualification 
 
Within Europe, ENIQ has an established methodology for inspection qualification [2] and it is 
recommended that this approach be adopted. 
 
An essential input to the ENIQ qualification process is the identification of appropriate 
inspection qualification requirements defining the defects of concern for which highly reliable 
detection and sizing is to be demonstrated.  The ENIQ qualification process, if followed to a 
successful outcome, provides high confidence that the inspection system can achieve the 
inspection qualification requirements for defect sizing and detection.  An important point to 
note is that it does not provide a quantitative measure of inspection efficiency.  Currently the 
output statement from the ENIQ qualification process is expressed in linguistic terms such as 
‘highly reliable’ or ‘highly efficient’.   
 
If a validated SRM is available, the ENIQ qualification defect size could be determined so 
that the proposed inspection aims at reducing the probability of failure of the inspected site 
by, for example, one decade.  Implicit in this would be the need to establish a simplified but 
still realistic quantitative estimate of the POD for defects greater than the qualification size.  
Consideration could also be given to the possibility of setting a lower qualification size in 
order to reduce the specific site risk even further if this is practical, without incurring 
unreasonable costs. 
 
 
4.11 Concept of living RI-ISI 
 
The risk assessment provides a ‘snap-shot’ of the risk distribution within the ISI boundary at 
a given point in time.  It is recommended that the risk assessment be kept ‘live’ so that it 
reflects as accurately as possible, the distribution of risk within the ISI boundary at the time of 
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 the ISI.  To ensure that this is the case, due cognisance should be taken of all currently 
available plant knowledge.  The determination of an effective risk-informed inspection 
strategy requires the development of a feedback procedure based on the idea of updating 
the risk ranking after plant changes affecting the probabilities of failure or consequences of 
failure have been made.  
 
The affected portions of the risk-informed in-service programme should be re-evaluated as 
new information affecting the implementation of the programme becomes available 
(component system design change, plant PSA changes, plant operating condition changes, 
industry-wide failure notifications, etc). 
 
Also very relevant is the information gathered after the inspection exercise has been 
completed (even if no acting damage mechanism is found) as it increases the knowledge of 
the plant and should be carefully fed back into the process.  This information clearly 
influences the assessment of the site probability of failure as the uncertainty concerning the 
presence or absence of a degradation mechanism is changed.  
 
This active (or living) process is one of the strengths of the risk-informed approach, as it 
leads to an enabling process that is both flexible and responsive to emerging problems. 
 
If evidence of significant damage is found by inspection it is assumed that actions are taken 
to reduce the increased risk.  These actions include substitution, repair, or 
fitness-for-purpose assessments to justify maintenance in service coupled with prescriptive 
follow-up inspections of the affected locations at subsequent outages.  An assessment 
should also be carried out during the current outage to determine whether the defect is due 
to particular conditions at the affected location(s) or if it is the consequence of a more 
widespread damage mechanism.  In the latter case, additional examinations should be 
carried out to determine the possible extent of the condition.  
 
From the point of view of a risk-informed methodology, the question must be posed as to 
whether the occurrence of the degradation was in line with that expected when the risk was 
assessed prior to inspection.  If the answer to this question is negative, then the models that 
were used to evaluate the probability of failure need to be reassessed. 
 
Even if no evidence of defects is found after the risk-informed ISI programme is completed, it 
is still very important to ponder the meaning of this result.  The critical issue then becomes 
the capability of the inspection technique (see sub-section 4.10.4 for a discussion on the 
issue of inspection qualification).  
 
Some guidance regarding living probabilistic safety assessment can be found in [16].  
Reference [17] provides eight examples of plants that have conducted updates to their RI-ISI 
programmes. 
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 5 ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The overall responsibility for the RI-IS programme lies with the plant operator (licensee). 
 
In this section the roles, responsibilities and interfaces of the different parties involved in the 
creation of a RI-ISI programme are described.  
 
It is recognised that utilities in different countries have different structures that vary in detail.  
Hence, what follows is a suggested management structure and interfaces that can be used 
as a guide to what is required in order to implement a risk-informed ISI programme. 
 
5.2 Outline of management structure 
 
The main parties/personnel involved are as follows: 
 
1) The RI-ISI Responsible Person.  
 
2) The RI-ISI Advisory Panel.  
 
3) The RI-ISI Team.  
 
4) The RI-ISI Review Panel.  
 
5) The Inspection Qualification Team. 
 
The reporting chain of the responsible parties/personnel is shown in Figure 5. 
 
RI-ISI Responsible
Person (Safety Director
or equivalent)
Chairperson
RI-ISI Team:
Systems
Operations
PSA
Inspection
Structural Integrity
Reliability
……..
Inspection Qualification
Team
QA
Review Panel
Independent Advisory
Panel
RI-ISI Process
 
Figure 5 Reporting Chain Identifying the Main Responsibilities in a RI-ISI Process 
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 5.3 Definition of responsibilities 
 
 
5.3.1 The RI-ISI responsible person 
 
The RI-ISI Responsible Person is responsible for setting the boundary and scope of the 
RI-ISI programme.  He or she is ultimately responsible for the acceptance of the final RI-ISI 
programme against the boundary and scope set, and for these reasons, the Responsible 
Person should be a senior employee of the utility.  
 
The Responsible Person will ensure that sufficient resources are made available for the full 
RI-ISI procedure to be followed through to the final Inspection Qualification and data 
archiving of the proposed inspections.  The Responsible Person will form the RI-ISI team and 
appoint its chairperson.  It will then be the RI-ISI team responsibility to recommend a RI-ISI 
programme to the Responsible Person.  In order to assist the Responsible Person in 
accepting the proposed RI-ISI programme, he or she may wish to form a RI-ISI Advisory 
Panel, appointing senior advisors. 
 
 
5.3.2 The RI-ISI independent advisory panel 
 
The responsibility of the Advisory Panel is to counsel the Responsible Person with regard to 
any areas of the proposed RI-ISI programme that in its opinion are questionable, be it from 
the analytical modelling used, possible omissions, external considerations, etc.  
 
The Advisory Panel will not have the power to change the risk rankings unilaterally or, more 
specifically, change how the probabilities or consequences of failure and hence the risk are 
derived.  It may recommend changes, verification of the work carried out, etc.  
 
The panel should raise any questions or concerns associated with ISI that may not be 
directly described in terms of the parameters used to measure the failure or consequence 
aspects of the risk-informed methodology adopted.  This would include political or public 
concerns that cannot be uniquely described in terms of the consequence. 
 
The RI-ISI Advisory Panel should be independent from commercial or operational 
considerations.  Representatives from the regulator could attend meetings of the panel as 
observers.  
 
 
5.3.3 The RI-ISI team 
 
The RI-ISI team will need to be a multi-disciplinary team, with expertise including quality, 
inspection, maintenance, design, materials, chemistry, stress analysis, systems, PSA, 
operations and safety. 
  
The RI-ISI team has the responsibility of developing the RI-ISI programme and following it 
through to its implementation.  It is responsible for co-ordinating the required effort within the 
utility, to produce the necessary documentation, compile the RI-ISI dossier and ensure that 
the relevant quality assurance (QA) procedures are followed and records kept. 
 
It is the responsibility of this team, via the authority of the RI-ISI Responsible Person, to 
ensure that the relevant departments within the utility provide the necessary support to 
generate a RI-ISI programme.  This support will be required to produce a ranking of the 
probabilities of failure and the consequences for all the probable inspection sites within the 
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 defined ISI boundary.  The team will be responsible for setting up expert elicitation exercises 
when required and ensuring an adequate interchange between the various experts required 
for a RI-ISI programme. 
 
The RI-ISI Team will present for review its probability of failure (POF) and consequence of 
failure (COF) rankings to the RI-ISI Review Panel.  It also has ultimate responsibility for the 
finalisation of the rankings of probability of failure and consequence of failure, and for 
integrating such rankings in order to construct a risk ranking for all the locations within the 
scope of the exercise. 
 
The RI-ISI team will establish a risk acceptance criterion, agreed with the Regulatory Body. 
 
The RI-ISI team will outline an inspection programme based on such risk ranking, Risk 
acceptance criterion and taking into due account:  
 
1) Risk outliers.  
2) High consequence-low probability sites.  
3) Defence in depth considerations.  
4) Uncertainties associated with the models, etc. 
 
In doing so, the team will also interface with the Inspection Qualification team to assess that 
the proposed inspection sites are both practical in the sense of carrying out the inspection 
and that there is a realistic chance of providing an inspection qualified to the ENIQ 
methodology. 
 
The RI-ISI team will present the RI-ISI programme for approval to the Responsible Person.  
 
 
5.3.4 The RI-ISI review panel 
 
The purpose of the Review Panel is to provide an essential independent element in the 
Quality Assurance process. 
 
The Review Panel should contain experts in the relevant areas that are independent from 
those belonging to the RI-ISI team.  Such experts could be from either inside or outside the 
utility.  Their independence must be ensured in the sense that they should not have been at 
any stage involved in the generation of the basic POF and COF data to be ranked. 
 
The critical task of the Review Panel is to review the work carried out by the utility (RI-ISI 
team) in deriving the estimates of POF and COF.  
 
As a part of the RI-ISI process, the RI-ISI team should provide the Review Panel with draft 
POF and COF rankings, plus details regarding the assumptions made and the calculations 
carried out.  The members of the Review Panel should be in dialogue with the RI-ISI Team to 
agree a final set of ranked values.  The RI-ISI team will ultimately be responsible for the 
finalisation of the ranking of the probabilities of failure and consequences of failure.  
 
The Review Panel should use all the pertinent probabilistic and deterministic data provided 
by the RI-ISI team plus any world data available, together with their own expertise and 
experience.  
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5.3.5 The Inspection Qualification team 
 
The Inspection Qualification team has the responsibility of advising the RI-ISI team with 
regard to the feasibility of achieving the specified outcomes from a proposed ISI programme.  
It should be clearly understood that the Inspection Qualification team cannot, at this time, 
guarantee that any subsequent inspection qualification against the specified requirements 
will be successful.  
 
 
5.3.6 The Regulatory Body 
 
In all countries the Regulatory Body is assigned the task of monitoring and evaluating safety 
and of ensuring that the licensee fulfils the conditions of its site licenses.  
 
In the context of a safety-driven RI-ISI programme, the Regulatory Body either defines or 
reviews the basic safety requirements that must be met.  
 
The Regulatory Body also undertakes audits, periodic reviews and monitors the licensee’s 
compliance with the safety requirements.  To these ends the Regulatory Body may wish to 
observe the development of any safety-driven RI-ISI programme.  For instance, the 
Regulatory Body may wish to participate with the status of observer in the RI-ISI Advisory 
Body meetings. 
 
 
   34
 6 DOCUMENTATION AND ARCHIVING  
 
 
6.1 RI-ISI programme dossier 
 
The RI-ISI team will prepare the RI-ISI dossier which should contain all information related to 
the whole process of risk-informed inspection planning and should comprise at least the 
following: 
 
1) Nomination of the personnel involved in the process. 
 
2) Scope of the RI-ISI programme. 
 
3) Input data. 
 
a) All data used in calculations (design specifications, historical plant data, etc.). 
b) Assumptions made. 
c) Models used. 
d) PSA data. 
e) Risk criteria used. 
 
4) Output data. 
 
a) Records of meetings of panels, etc.. 
b) List of sites to be inspected. 
c) Requirements for inspection qualification under ENIQ (including qualification 
level). 
d) Subsequent analysis. 
e) Further action required. 
f) Risk change for sites inspected. 
 
If parts of this information cannot be included, precise references should be made in the 
RI-ISI dossier. 
 
 
6.2 Obsolescence of storage medium  
 
Problems associated with the future obsolescence of the medium used for storing the RI-ISI 
Dossier information should be properly addressed. 
 
   35

 7 REFERENCES  
 
 
[1] European methodology for qualification of non-destructive testing - first issue, ENIQ 
Report N.1, EUR 16139 EN, 1995. 
[2] European methodology for qualification of non-destructive testing - second issue, 
ENIQ Report N.2, EUR 17299 EN, 1997. 
[3] Discussion document on risk-informed in-service inspection of nuclear power plants 
in Europe, ENIQ report nr. 21, EUR 19742 EN, December 2000.  
[4] Report on the Regulatory Experience of Risk-Informed In-service Inspection of 
Nuclear Power Plant Components and Common Views, Prepared by The Nuclear 
Regulators’ Working Group - Task Force on Risk-Informed In-service Inspection, 
Final Report – August 2004, EUR 21320 EN. 
[5] Defence in Depth in Nuclear Safety, INSAG- 10, IAEA, Vienna, Austria, 1996. 
[6] Nuclear Risk-Based Inspection Methodology for passive components (NURBIM), 
Project contract FIKS-CT-2001-00172. 
[7] Severe Accident Risks: An Assessment for Five U.S. Nuclear Power Plants, Final 
Report, US NRC NUREG-1150, Vols. 1-3, December 1990. 
[8] WASH-1400 (NUREG-75/014), Reactor Safety Study, An Assessment of Accident 
Risks in U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, October 1975. 
[9] ASME - Standard for Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant 
Applications- RA-S-2002. 
[10] Probabilistic Risk Assessment Peer Review Process Guidance, Revision A3, 
Nuclear Energy Institute, NEI-00-02, March 2002. 
[11] A Framework for Quality Assurance Programme for PSA, IAEA-TECDOC-1101, 
1999. 
[12] Applications of Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) for nuclear power plants, 
IAEA-TECDOC-1200, 2001. 
[13] PSA Quality for Applications, IAEA-TECDOC-xxxx, 2005 (in print). 
[14] Review of Probabilistic Safety Assessments by Regulatory Bodies, Safety Reports 
Series No. 25, 2002. 
[15] ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI: Rules for In-service Inspection 
of Nuclear Power Plant Components, Document Number: ASME Section XI, 
American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2001. 
[16] Living Probabilistic Safety Assessment (LPSA), IAEA-TECDOC-1106, 1999. 
[17] Living Program Guidance To Maintain Risk-Informed In-service Inspection Programs 
For Nuclear Plant Piping Systems, Nuclear Energy Institute, NEI 04-05, April 2004. 
 
   37

 APPENDIX 1 – Definitions 
 
 
ALLOWED OUTAGE TIME.  The number of hours the plant may operate under a 
pre-defined configuration (e.g. inoperable equipment) as controlled by the limiting 
condition(s) for operation in the Technical Specifications. 
 
 
APPROACHES TO RI-ISI: Three different approaches are used: the purely quantitative, the 
purely qualitative and the semi-quantitative approach. 
 
Purely quantitative approach 
In a purely quantitative approach, numerical estimates are determined for probabilities of 
failures and consequences of failures.  Fully validated and verified Structural Reliability 
Models are used to determine POFs and the plant Probabilistic Safety Assessment is 
used to calculate COFs.  
 
Purely qualitative approach 
In a purely qualitative approach, both the POFs and COFs are characterised by qualitative 
terms, such as extremely low, low, high, etc.  In this framework, expert elicitation is used 
to rank the POF and COF of individual components.  The purely qualitative approach does 
not use the quantitative risk assessment (PSA) results in the consequence evaluation.  A 
qualitative analysis can be used to allow systems to be quickly prioritised for further more 
detailed (quantitative) risk analysis. 
 
Semi-quantitative approach 
A semi-quantitative approach is one where the COFs are based on PSA results, but the 
PSA information may be expressed equally well in quantitative or qualitative terms.  The 
failure probabilities may be partly evaluated using fully validated and verified SRM, but 
partly also using experience data and expert elicitation.  The resulting risk plot or risk 
matrix can be expressed on a qualitative scale but with quantitative links aiding a realistic 
assessment of the true risk. 
 
 
CONDITIONAL CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY (CCDF): Conditional frequency of core 
damage, given a loss of a mitigating ability. 
 
 
CONDITIONAL CORE DAMAGE PROBABILITY (CCDP): Conditional probability of core 
damage, given an initiating event. 
 
 
CONDITIONAL LARGE EARLY RELEASE PROBABILITY (CLERP): Conditional probability 
of a large early release, given an initiating event. 
 
 
CONSEQUENCE OF FAILURE: See section 3. 
 
 
CORE DAMAGE:  Heating-up of the reactor core (typically following loss of coolant) to the 
point where damage to reactor fuel elements or cladding takes place. 
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 CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY: An estimated frequency of occurrence of events leading to 
core damage.  
 
 
DEFENCE IN DEPTH: A design and operational philosophy with regard to nuclear facilities 
that calls for multiple layers of protection to prevent and mitigate accidents.  It includes the 
use of controls, multiple physical barriers to prevent release of radiation, redundant and 
diverse key safety functions, and emergency response measures.  
 
 
EXTERNAL EVENT: An event that initiates outside of plant systems and results in the 
perturbation of steady-state plant operation (e.g., seismic event, storm, etc.). 
 
 
FAILURE: See section 3. 
 
 
FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA): A detailed technique specifically 
designed to identify the failure of an analysed component, the impacts of the failure on 
operations, the system and surrounding components, and controls for limiting the 
probability of such failures. 
 
 
INITIATING EVENT: An event that perturbs steady-state plant operation or normal shutdown 
evolution resulting in a plant transient and challenge to control and safety systems.   
Based on its origin, an initiating event can be an internal or external event. 
 
 
IN-SERVICE INSPECTION (ISI): An inspection performed after commissioning inspections 
and test runs are satisfactorily completed and the system or component has been certified 
or accepted for normal service operation.  The objective of such inspections is to detect 
degradation that might have occurred during plant operation. 
 
 
INTERNAL EVENT: An event that initiates within plant systems and results in the 
perturbation of steady-state plant operation (e.g., loss of coolant, loss of heat sink, etc.) 
 
 
LARGE EARLY RELEASE: A radioactive release from the containment which is both large 
and early.  Large is defined as involving the rapid, unscrubbed release of airborne aerosol 
fission products to the environment.  Early is defined as occurring before the effective 
implementation of the off-site emergency response and protective actions. 
 
 
PIPING SEGMENT: Continuous length of piping with the same degradation mechanism and 
failure consequence.  
 
 
PIPING SYSTEM: An assembly of piping segments with defined functions.  A piping system 
might include one or more AMSE Code classes. 
 
 
PRESSURE BOUNDARY FAILURE.  Piping element failures involving ruptures or leakage 
that result in a reduction or loss of the element pressure-retaining capability. 
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PROBABILISTIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT (PSA): A quantitative assessment of risk.  For 
nuclear power plant application, the risk is associated with plant operation and 
maintenance.  Risk is measured in terms of the frequency of occurrence of various 
events, leading to a consequence of interest (e.g., core damage or release of radioactive 
material). 
 
 
PROBABILITY: A numerical measure of the state of confidence about the outcome of an 
event. 
 
 
PROBABILITY OF FAILURE: See section 3. 
 
 
RISK: See section 3. 
 
 
RISK- INFORMED IN-SERVICE INSPECTION (RI-ISI): In-service inspection optimised with 
risk insights. 
 
 
RISK REDUCTION: The risk reduction achieved by the ISI programme is the amount by 
which the total risk is reduced by undertaking ISI. 
 
 
RISK REDUCTION WORTH: An importance measure indicating the maximum possible 
reduction factor in risk, if the item under consideration (e.g. a pipe segment) is assumed 
perfectly reliable.   
 
 
SEGMENTS:  See piping segment. 
 
 
SPATIAL EFFECTS: The indirect impact of an event affecting other systems and 
components in the spatial vicinity, including flooding, spray, pipe whip, jet impingement, 
etc. 
 
 
STRUCTURAL RELIABILITY MODELS: Models concerned with the calculation and 
prediction of the probability of safety limit state violations (failure) for engineering 
structures. 
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 APPENDIX 2 – Abbreviations 
 
ALARP: As Low As Reasonably Practicable 
ASME: American Society of Mechanical Engineers 
BWR: Boiling Water Reactor 
CCDP: Conditional Core Damage Probability 
CCDF Conditional Core Damage Frequency 
CCF: Common Cause failures  
CDF: Core Damage Frequency 
CLERP: Conditional Large Early Release Probability 
COF: Consequence of Failure 
ENIQ:  European Network for Inspection and Qualification 
FMEA: Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency 
ISI: In-Service Inspection  
LERF: Large Early Release Frequency 
LOCA: Loss of Coolant Accident 
NPP: Nuclear Power Plant 
NRWG:   Nuclear Regulators’ Working Group 
POD:  Probability of Detection 
POF: Probability of Failure 
PSA: Probabilistic Safety Assessment 
QA: Quality Assurance 
RBMK: Reactor Bolshoy Moshchnosty Kanalny (Russian designed high-power 
channel reactor) 
RI-ISI:  Risk-Informed In-Service Inspection  
RPV: Reactor Pressure Vessel 
RRW: Risk Reduction Worth 
SCC:  Stress Corrosion Cracking 
SC  Steering Committee 
SRM:  Structural Reliability Model 
TGQ ENIQ Task Group Qualification 
TGR ENIQ Task Group Risk 
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